A common method in the practice of large scale auction design, e.g., in auctions placing advertisements on online media and Internet search engines, is A/B testing. In A/B testing, the auction house is running an incumbent mechanism A, and would like to determine if a novel mechanism B obtains higher revenue. This is done by splitting the traffic so that most of it goes to A and some of it, e.g., five to ten percent, goes to B. An issue with this approach is that if the bidders are unaware of which mechanism their bid will be considered in, the bid equilibrium is neither for A nor B but for a mechanism C that is a convex combination of A and B.
the organic search results. Typical layouts include between zero and three advertisements in the mainline. The weights, which correspond to click probabilities, depend on which of these four layout choices is selected. The optimal number of ads to show on the mainline is distinct for each search query and our methods allow these layouts to be optimized individually. Notice that this setting generalizes the opening example of selecting whether to sell one or two units of an item. Chawla et al. [2014] developed an estimator for the revenue of one position auction (A or B) from the bids of another (C). This estimator is a simple weighted order statistic of the distribution of equilibrium bids in C. To estimate the revenue of B (likewise, A):
(1) for any number N , the evaluation of a formula based on the definition of B and C gives N weights, and, (2) given a sorted list of N i.i.d. samples from the bid distribution for C, the estimated revenue of B is the weighted average of these bids.
This method compares favorably to ideal A/B testing, where the bids in A are in equilibrium for A and revenue can be estimated by simple averaging, respectively for B. The present paper improves the analysis of the estimator of Chawla et al. [2014] and applies this refined analysis to the application of A/B testing. In an A/B test where mechanism C puts probability on B (and 1 − probability on A), our error bounds have better dependence on than ideal A/B testing. In ideal A/B testing with a total of N bid samples, there are N samples from B. Thus, the standard statistical error in estimating the revenue of B is O(1/ √ N ). Our error bounds depend on as log 1/ , a significant improvement. In particular, we obtain good bounds even when < 1/N and the ideal A/B test is unlikely to have ever run the B mechanism. The reason for this improvement is that, while the ideal A/B test mechanism only sees N bids that depend on B, all bids in our A/B test mechanism C depend a little bit on the presence of B. Our main results are as follows:
-For arbitrary n-agent position auctions A and B, and C defined as (1 − )A + B, the revenue of B can be estimated from N bids from the equilibrium bid distribution of C with absolute error bounded by O(
). -For arbitrary n-agent position auctions A, B 1 , and B 2 , and C defined as (1 − 2 )A + B 1 + B 2 , N bids from the equilibrium bid distribution of C can be used to establish which of B 1 and B 2 has higher revenue, with error probability bounded by exp(−O(N/ poly(n) log(1/ ))). -The position auction B with position weights w 1 = 1, w k = 1/2 for 1 < k < n − 1, and w n = 0, that is, that sells one or n − 1 items with equal probability, is a universal B-test in the following sense: for arbitrary position auction A, and C = (1 − )A + B, the revenue of any position auction can be determined from N bids of C with error bounded by O(
).
